Optimal Sequential Contests

48 Pages Posted: 20 Feb 2018 Last revised: 24 Jan 2022

See all articles by Toomas Hinnosaar

Toomas Hinnosaar

University of Nottingham - School of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 24, 2022

Abstract

I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has a range of applications, including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of the commons. I show that information about other players' efforts increases the total effort. Thus, the total effort is maximized with full transparency and minimized with no transparency. I also show that in addition to the first-mover advantage, there is an earlier-mover advantage. Finally, I derive the limits for large contests.

Keywords: contest design, oligopoly, public goods, rent-seeking, R&D

JEL Classification: C72, C73, D72, D82, D74

Suggested Citation

Hinnosaar, Toomas, Optimal Sequential Contests (January 24, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3119014 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3119014

Toomas Hinnosaar (Contact Author)

University of Nottingham - School of Economics ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG7 2RD
United Kingdom

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