Global Corporations, Bribery and Corrupt Practices - Anti-Bribery Laws and the Limits of State Action

(2018) Law and Financial Markets Review (Forthcoming)

23 Pages Posted: 26 Feb 2018

See all articles by Roman Tomasic

Roman Tomasic

University of South Australia; Durham University - Law School

Date Written: November 30, 2017

Abstract

The regulation and control of bribery and corrupt practices by globally active corporations has become a matter of increasing concern in recent years. For many years the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977) has stood as a model for other countries. Other countries have been slow to introduce improved anti-bribery laws and have often only been prompted to review their laws and practices in this area as a result of major corporate scandals. The passage of the UK Bribery Act (2010) has now provided a more broad-ranging model that has built upon prior experiences, such as in the USA, as well as upon advances in regulatory theory. Multilateral efforts, such as by the G20, have also become more important in encouraging countries to enhance global anti-bribery mechanisms. This paper critically examines this national and multilateral regulatory experience and discusses difficulties that individual states, such as Australia, have had in responding to the need for more effective anti-bribery laws and enforcement mechanisms.

Keywords: Control of bribery, anti-bribery laws, Globalisation, Limits of Law

Suggested Citation

Tomasic, Roman A., Global Corporations, Bribery and Corrupt Practices - Anti-Bribery Laws and the Limits of State Action (November 30, 2017). (2018) Law and Financial Markets Review (Forthcoming), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3124082

Roman A. Tomasic (Contact Author)

University of South Australia ( email )

GPO Box 2471
ADELAIDE
City West, 5001
Australia

Durham University - Law School ( email )

Palatine Centre
Stockton Road
Durham, Durham
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.durham.ac.uk

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