The Challenges of Multi-Level Coordination in Post-Crisis Banking Regulation

CERiM Online Paper No. 3/2018

36 Pages Posted: 9 Mar 2018

See all articles by Lucia Quaglia

Lucia Quaglia

University of Bologna - Faculty of Political Science

Aneta Spendzharova

Maastricht University

Date Written: March 6, 2018

Abstract

After the international financial crisis, new financial regulations were adopted at the international, regional (EU) and national levels. The timing, the sequencing and the interaction of reforms at different levels followed distinct patterns, which had implications for the design and the coherence of the rules. Despite the proliferation of new and amended international standards in finance, there are no formal mechanisms in the EU to ensure regulatory coherence in the multi-level, multi-venue regulatory dynamics observed in this sector. To shed light on this issue, we investigate the setting of rules on loss absorbing capacity (LAC) for banks, which is one of the main recent areas of post-crisis reform. We expect that regulators will play a key role in the quest for coherence in finance. The central hypothesis investigated in this paper is that they are better able to secure regulatory coherence when they have considerable rule-making competences.

Keywords: Eurozone, Financial Crisis, Loss Absorbing Capacity, Multi-Level Coordination, Banking Regulation

Suggested Citation

Quaglia, Lucia and Spendzharova, Aneta, The Challenges of Multi-Level Coordination in Post-Crisis Banking Regulation (March 6, 2018). CERiM Online Paper No. 3/2018 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3135290 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3135290

Lucia Quaglia (Contact Author)

University of Bologna - Faculty of Political Science ( email )

Via Giacomo della Torre 5
Forli 47100, 40100
Italy

Aneta Spendzharova

Maastricht University

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, Limburg 6200MD
Netherlands

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