Cambridge Analytica, the Game Theory and the Nash Theory of Equilibrium

Ojo, Marianne (2018). Information Uncertainty and Risk Assessment in Trade Relations

40 Pages Posted: 18 Apr 2018 Last revised: 3 Oct 2018

See all articles by Marianne Ojo D Delaney PhD

Marianne Ojo D Delaney PhD

American Accounting Association; Centre for Innovation and Sustainable Development (CISD); Centre for Innovation and Sustainable Development (CISD)

Date Written: March 31, 2018

Abstract

In their publication, Narrative on Local Democracies, Government, and Public Policy in the Colombian Pacific, Cendales et al (2018): propose a deep, detailed and courageous study of a specific and pertinent problematic from an interdisciplinary perspective, starting from the history, the story, the mathematical theory of games and the instruments provided by micro-econometrics.

As well as a consideration of whether the main problems, namely problems related to state building, democratic representation, and imbalances of institutional frameworks, as highlighted in the book, are actually addressed, the ongoing case of Cambridge Analytica, illustrates that many other actors and players are involved in the game of electoral campaigns and elections – other than merely voters (median or otherwise) and the main political parties.

Outcomes relating to investigations and intentions by information ministers, Congress, impending warrants in the coming months – as well as the review of data and privacy regulations following parliamentary and legislative interventions in the case pertaining to Cambridge Analytica, will possibly shape the landscape for voters or may have little impact in forthcoming elections.

Keywords: Game theory, Nash Theory of Equilibrium, Cambridge Analytica, Forensic audits, Data analytics

Suggested Citation

Ojo D Delaney PhD, Marianne, Cambridge Analytica, the Game Theory and the Nash Theory of Equilibrium (March 31, 2018). Ojo, Marianne (2018). Information Uncertainty and Risk Assessment in Trade Relations , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3153801

Marianne Ojo D Delaney PhD (Contact Author)

American Accounting Association ( email )

5717 Bessie Drive
Sarasota, FL 34233-2399
United States

Centre for Innovation and Sustainable Development (CISD) ( email )

United States

Centre for Innovation and Sustainable Development (CISD) ( email )

United States

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