Intergenerational Spillovers in Disability Insurance

54 Pages Posted: 25 May 2018 Last revised: 22 May 2022

See all articles by Gordon B. Dahl

Gordon B. Dahl

University of California, San Diego (UCSD); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Anne C. Gielen

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)

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Date Written: February 2018

Abstract

Using a 1993 Dutch policy reform and a regression discontinuity design, we find children of parents whose disability insurance (DI) eligibility was reduced are 11% less likely to participate in DI themselves, do not alter their use of other government programs, and earn 2% more as adults. The reduced transfers and increased taxes of children account for 40% of the fiscal savings relative to parents in present discounted value terms. Moreover, children of treated parents complete more schooling, have a lower probability of serious criminal arrests and incarceration, and take fewer mental health drugs as adults.

Suggested Citation

Dahl, Gordon B. and Gielen, Anne C., Intergenerational Spillovers in Disability Insurance (February 2018). NBER Working Paper No. w24296, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3182204

Gordon B. Dahl (Contact Author)

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Mail Code 0502
La Jolla, CA 92093-0112
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Anne C. Gielen

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands

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