Is it Just Luring Reported Profit? The Case of European Patent Boxes

48 Pages Posted: 21 Jul 2018

See all articles by Marko Köthenbürger

Marko Köthenbürger

ETH Zurich - Department of Management, Technology and Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Federica Liberini

ETH Zürich - KOF Swiss Economic Institute

Michael Stimmelmayr

University of Bath - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: June 01, 2018

Abstract

Patent box regimes have become increasingly popular as an instrument to attract taxable income from intellectual property (IP). This paper assesses the quantitative impact of patent box regimes on profit shifting by multinational enterprises (MNEs). We proxy the ability to access the tax benefit of the patent box by historical IP ownership. On average, affiliates belonging to MNEs with historical IP ownership report, after the introduction of a patent box, 8.5 percent higher profit compared to their counterparts with no IP ownership. Patent boxes do not only lure reported profit. The pre-tax profit change is a net effect and thus also accounts for reversed internal debt shifting out of the country and productivity changes. The overall behavioral adjustments might lower corporate tax revenues. Further, the design of the patent box and the existence of a tax haven affiliate within an MNE turn out to be critical for the amount of profits shifted.

Keywords: corporate tax avoidance, patent box, multinational enterprise, profit shifting

JEL Classification: H250, H260, F230, C210, C230

Suggested Citation

Köthenbürger, Marko and Liberini, Federica and Stimmelmayr, Michael, Is it Just Luring Reported Profit? The Case of European Patent Boxes (June 01, 2018). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 7061, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3211147 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3211147

Marko Köthenbürger (Contact Author)

ETH Zurich - Department of Management, Technology and Economics ( email )

Leonhardstrasse 21
Zurich, 8092
Switzerland
+41 44 6325446 (Phone)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Federica Liberini

ETH Zürich - KOF Swiss Economic Institute ( email )

Zurich
Switzerland

Michael Stimmelmayr

University of Bath - Department of Economics ( email )

Claverton Down
Bath, BA2 7AY
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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