Cosmetic Surgery: Reviewer Signal-Jamming and Compulsory Embellishment in the Publication Process (Presentation Slides)

Abstract

These slides correspond to the paper "Cosmetic Surgery in the Academic Review Process" Has the academic review process become excessive? I describe a model in which reviewers who seek reputations with editors for high skill recommend the repair of mere blemishes as well as significant flaws. Reviewer signal-jamming is profitable if editors have trouble distinguishing the two, leading in equilibrium to insistence upon cosmetic surgery. Indeed, if there is a chance that blemishes are unremovable, in equilibrium editor and reviewer demands sometimes cause good papers to remain unpublished. This implies a socially valuable role for active editing. Signal-jamming incentives may especially suppress innovative papers, as well as external verification by means of follow-up papers. This perspective strongly suggests that the increased burden of the review process is undesirable. I offer tentative thoughts about what to do about it. Prepublication version of paper downloadable at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2536064

Keywords: cosmetic surgery, review process, publication process, publication delay, academic journals, sociology of science, signal-jamming, reputation, information asymmetry

JEL Classification: A14, G00, L86, D82