Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan

52 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 2018

See all articles by Ruben Enikolopov

Ruben Enikolopov

New Economic School; Institute of Political Economy and Governance; ICREA; Universitat Pompeu Fabra; Barcelona GSE

Date Written: July 2018

Abstract

Using data from a field experiment across 500 villages in Afghanistan, we study how electoral accountability of local institutions affects the quality of governance. In villages with newly created elected councils, food aid distributed by local leaders is more likely to reach needy villagers. However, this effect is observed only if the council is mandated to be the entity responsible for managing the distribution. In the absence of such a mandate the presence of elected councils increases embezzlement without improving aid targeting. Thus, while elected councils can improve governance, unclear and overlapping mandates may increase rent-seeking and worsen governance outcomes.

Keywords: democratization, field experiment, governance quality, Political Institutions

JEL Classification: D7, O1

Suggested Citation

Enikolopov, Ruben and Enikolopov, Ruben, Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan (July 2018). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13053, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3218377

Ruben Enikolopov (Contact Author)

New Economic School ( email )

Nobel 3
Moscow, Moscow 121205
Russia

Institute of Political Economy and Governance ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

ICREA ( email )

Passeig Lluís Companys, 23
Barcelona, 08010
Spain

Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, E-08005
Spain

Barcelona GSE ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

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