Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations

50 Pages Posted: 12 Aug 2002

See all articles by Martin Cripps

Martin Cripps

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School; University College London - Department of Economics

George J. Mailath

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; Research School of Economics, ANU

Larry Samuelson

Yale University - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Date Written: July 2002

Abstract

We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not eventually play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for non-credible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring.

Keywords: Reputation, Imperfect Monitoring, Repeated Game, Commitment

JEL Classification: C70, C78

Suggested Citation

Cripps, Martin and Cripps, Martin and Mailath, George J. and Samuelson, Larry, Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations (July 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=322160 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.322160

Martin Cripps

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1133
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States
314-935-4580 (Phone)
314-935-6359 (Fax)

University College London - Department of Economics ( email )

Gower Street
London
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

George J. Mailath (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7908 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://web.sas.upenn.edu/gmailath/

Research School of Economics, ANU ( email )

HW Arndt Building
College of Business and Economics
Canberra, ACT 2601
Australia

Larry Samuelson

Yale University - Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States