Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
50 Pages Posted: 12 Aug 2002
Date Written: July 2002
Abstract
We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not eventually play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for non-credible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring.
Keywords: Reputation, Imperfect Monitoring, Repeated Game, Commitment
JEL Classification: C70, C78
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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