An experimental investigation of how self-interested organizational norms undermine prosocial motivation and influence employee effort

Journal of Information Systems doi.org/10.2308/ISYS-19-047

46 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2018 Last revised: 8 Jul 2020

See all articles by Jace Garrett

Jace Garrett

Clemson University

Kip Holderness

West Virginia University

Kari Olsen

Utah Valley University

Date Written: June 01, 2020

Abstract

Managers often implement behavioral controls to prevent free riding, especially in group settings where individual effort is difficult to measure. We argue that to the extent these controls signal a norm of self-interest in the workplace, they are likely to result in lower trust and employee effort. We predict and find that controls that send stronger signals of self-interest are especially detrimental to employees with high levels of prosocial motivation—individuals who tend to be less self-interested than their peers. Our results suggest managers should consider how behavioral controls signal self-interested organizational norms and influence employee outcomes.

Keywords: control systems, prosocial motivation, manager incentives, control explanations, trust

Suggested Citation

Garrett, Jace and Holderness, Darin Kip and Olsen, Kari, An experimental investigation of how self-interested organizational norms undermine prosocial motivation and influence employee effort (June 01, 2020). Journal of Information Systems doi.org/10.2308/ISYS-19-047, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3230267 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3230267

Jace Garrett (Contact Author)

Clemson University ( email )

Clemson, SC 29631
United States

Darin Kip Holderness

West Virginia University ( email )

PO Box 6025
Morgantown, WV 26506
United States
3042937847 (Phone)
3042930635 (Fax)

Kari Olsen

Utah Valley University ( email )

800 West University Parkway
Orem, UT 84058
United States

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