Lying, Risk and Accuracy
Analysis Vol 77 | Number 4 | October 2017 | pp. 726–734 doi:10.1093/analys/anx105
13 Pages Posted: 24 Sep 2018
Date Written: August 2, 2017
Abstract
Almost all philosophers agree that a necessary condition on lying is that one says what one believes to be false. But, philosophers haven’t considered the possibility that the true requirement on lying concerns, rather, one’s degree-of-belief. Liars impose a risk on their audience. The greater the liar’s confidence that what she asserts is false, the greater the risk she’ll think she’s imposing on the dupe, and, therefore, the greater her blameworthiness. From this, I arrive at a dilemma: either the belief requirement is wrong, or lying isn’t interesting. I suggest an alternative necessary condition for lying on a degree-of-belief framework.
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