The Option Value of Forest Concessions in Brazilian Amazon

Posted: 23 Sep 2002

See all articles by Ajax R. Moreira

Ajax R. Moreira

Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) - Directory of Macroeconomic Policy & Studies (DIMAC)

Katia Rocha

IPEA-Institute for Applied Economic Research of the Brazilian Government

Eustáquio José Reis

IPEA - Institute of Applied Economic Research

Leonardo Carvalho

Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA)

Abstract

The Brazilian government is now planning to implement natural forest concessions for timber extraction. In addition to the legal requirements imposed on the management of concessions (minimum reserves, maximum extraction rates, etc.), the value of concessions is closely linked with uncertainties in estimates of the volume of commercial logs within the concession area and on future timber prices.

Keywords: Brazil, Amazonia, Forest Concessions, Real Option Theory, Econometric Spatial

JEL Classification: G13, C10

Suggested Citation

Moreira, Ajax R. and Rocha, Katia and Reis, Eustáquio José and Carvalho, Leonardo, The Option Value of Forest Concessions in Brazilian Amazon. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=324180

Ajax R. Moreira

Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) - Directory of Macroeconomic Policy & Studies (DIMAC) ( email )

Av. Presidente Antonio Carlos 51
10 Andar Centro
Rio de Janeiro RJ 20020-010
Brazil
+55 21 3804 8000 (Phone)
+55 21 2240 1920 (Fax)

Katia Rocha (Contact Author)

IPEA-Institute for Applied Economic Research of the Brazilian Government ( email )

Av. Presidente Antonio Carlos 51
17th. Centro
Rio de Janeiro RJ 20020-010, Rio de Janeiro 20020-010
Brazil
+55 21 35158658 (Phone)
+55 21 35158615 (Fax)

Eustáquio José Reis

IPEA - Institute of Applied Economic Research ( email )

Av. Pres. Antonio Carlos , 51 - 17 andar
Rio de Janeiro, RJ 20.020-010
Brazil
+55 21 35158680 (Phone)
+55 21 35158615 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.nemsis.org.br

Leonardo Carvalho

Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) ( email )

Av. Pres. Antonio Carlos , 51 - 17 andar
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, 20020-010
Brazil

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