Inheritance Taxation and Wealth Effects on the Labor Supply of Heirs

51 Pages Posted: 24 Sep 2018

See all articles by Fabian Kindermann

Fabian Kindermann

University of Regensburg; Netspar

Lukas Mayr

University of Essex

Dominik Sachs

European University Institute; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 2018

Abstract

The taxation of bequests can have a positive impact on the labor supply of heirs through wealth effects. This leads to an increase in future labor income tax revenue on top of direct bequest tax revenue. We first show in a theoretical model that a simple back-of-the envelope calculation, based on existing estimates for the reduction in earnings after wealth transfers, fails: the marginal propensity to earn out of unearned income is not a sufficient statistic for the calculation of this effect because (i) heirs anticipate the reduction in net bequests and adjust their labor supply already prior to inheriting, and (ii) when bequest receipt is stochastic, even those who ex post end up not inheriting anything respond ex ante to the implied change in their distribution of net bequests. We quantitatively elaborate the size of the overall revenue effect due to labor supply changes of heirs by using a state of the art life-cycle model that we calibrate to the German economy. Besides the joint distribution of income and inheritances, quasi-experimental evidence regarding the size of wealth effects on labor supply is a key target for this calibration. We find that for each Euro of bequest tax revenue the government mechanically generates, it obtains an additional 9 Cents of labor income tax revenue (in net present value) through higher labor supply of (non-)heirs.

Keywords: bequests, dynamic scoring, labor-supply, life-cycle, taxation

JEL Classification: C68, D91, H22, H31, J22

Suggested Citation

Kindermann, Fabian and Mayr, Lukas and Sachs, Dominik, Inheritance Taxation and Wealth Effects on the Labor Supply of Heirs (September 2018). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13185, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3254220

Fabian Kindermann (Contact Author)

University of Regensburg ( email )

Universitaetsstrasse 31
D-93040 Regensburg
Germany

Netspar ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Lukas Mayr

University of Essex

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester, CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom

Dominik Sachs

European University Institute ( email )

Villa Schifanoia
133 via Bocaccio
Firenze (Florence), Tuscany 50014
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
1
Abstract Views
329
PlumX Metrics