Property Rights, Marriage, and Fertility in the Italian Alps, 1790–1820

Posted: 30 Oct 2018 Last revised: 1 Mar 2022

See all articles by Marco Casari

Marco Casari

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Maurizio Lisciandra

LUMSA University

Claudio Tagliapietra

Faculty of Theology

Date Written: 2019

Abstract

Does property rights allocation on the commons affect marriage strategies and fertility? We focus on the role played by patrilineal vs. egalitarian inheritance systems. Our approach combines a theoretical model and an empirical study that exploits an institutional shock at the turn of the 19th century, which made inheritance on the common property-resources egalitarian for everyone. We report that – as predicted by the model – communities with patrilineal inheritance rights on the commons exhibit higher levels of endogamy and consanguinity and lower fertility than those with egalitarian inheritance rights.

Keywords: Common-Pool Resources, Inheritance, Land Tenure, Napoleon

JEL Classification: D23, N53, P48,

Suggested Citation

Casari, Marco and Lisciandra, Maurizio and Tagliapietra, Claudio, Property Rights, Marriage, and Fertility in the Italian Alps, 1790–1820 (2019). Casari M., Lisciandra M., Tagliapietra C. (2019). Property Rights, Marriage, and Fertility in the Italian Alps, 1790-1820. Explorations in Economic History, 71: 72-92.DOI: 10.1016/j.eeh.2018.09.001., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3262095

Marco Casari (Contact Author)

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy

Maurizio Lisciandra

LUMSA University

Department of Law, Economics, and Communication
Via Filippo Parlatore 65
Palermo, 90145
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.lumsa.it/en

Claudio Tagliapietra

Faculty of Theology ( email )

Piazza di Sant'Apollinare, 49
Roma, 00186
Italy

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