High Stakes: A Little More Cheating, a Lot Less Charity

Rahwan, Z., Hauser, O. P., Kochanowska, E., & Fasolo, B. (2018). High stakes: A little more cheating, a lot less charity. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

44 Pages Posted: 15 Nov 2018

See all articles by Zoe Rahwan

Zoe Rahwan

Harvard Kennedy School

Oliver Hauser

University of Exeter Business School - Department of Economics

Ewa Kochanowska

University of Navarra, IESE Business School

Barbara Fasolo

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Operational Research

Date Written: October 4, 2017

Abstract

We explore the downstream consequences of cheating–and resisting the temptation to cheat–at high stakes on pro-social behavior and self-perceptions. In a large online sample, we replicate the seminal finding that cheating rates are largely insensitive to stake size, even at a 500-fold increase. We present two new findings. First, resisting the temptation to cheat at high stakes led to negative moral spill-over, triggering a moral license: participants who resisted cheating in the high stakes condition subsequently donated a smaller fraction of their earnings to charity. Second, participants who cheated maximally mispredicted their perceived morality: although such participants thought they were less prone to feeling immoral if they cheated, they ended up feeling more immoral a day after the cheating task than immediately afterwards. We discuss the theoretical implications of our findings on moral balancing and self-deception, and the practical relevance for organisational design.

Keywords: Cheating Incentives, Moral Licensing, Moral Self-Perceptions, Pro-Social Behavior

Suggested Citation

Rahwan, Zoe and Hauser, Oliver and Kochanowska, Ewa and Fasolo, Barbara, High Stakes: A Little More Cheating, a Lot Less Charity (October 4, 2017). Rahwan, Z., Hauser, O. P., Kochanowska, E., & Fasolo, B. (2018). High stakes: A little more cheating, a lot less charity. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3271768

Zoe Rahwan (Contact Author)

Harvard Kennedy School ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Oliver Hauser

University of Exeter Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

Streatham Court
Exeter, EX4 4RJ
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.oliverhauser.org

Ewa Kochanowska

University of Navarra, IESE Business School ( email )

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

Barbara Fasolo

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Operational Research ( email )

Houghton Street
London, England WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+020 7955 7617 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.lse.ac.uk/people/b.fasolo@lse.ac.uk/

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