Voter Response to Peak and End Transfers: Evidence From a Conditional Cash Transfer Experiment

50 Pages Posted: 28 Nov 2018

See all articles by Sebastian Galiani

Sebastian Galiani

University of Maryland - Department of Economics

Nadya Hajj

Wellesley College

Patrick J. McEwan

Wellesley College, Department of Economics

Pablo Ibarraran

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Nandita Krishnaswamy

Columbia University

Date Written: November 4, 2018

Abstract

In a Honduran field experiment, sequences of cash transfers to poor households varied in amount of the largest (“peak”) and last (“end”) transfers. Larger peak-end transfers increased voter turnout and the incumbent party’s vote share in the 2013 presidential election, independently of cumulative transfers. A plausible explanation is that voters succumbed to a common cognitive bias by applying peak-end heuristics. Another is that voters deliberately used peak-end transfers to update beliefs about the incumbent party. In either case, the results provide experimental evidence on the classic non-experimental finding that voters are especially sensitive to recent economic activity.

Keywords: conditional cash transfers, voter behavior, experiments

JEL Classification: H3, I38

Suggested Citation

Galiani, Sebastian and Hajj, Nadya and McEwan, Patrick J. and Ibarraran, Pablo and Krishnaswamy, Nandita, Voter Response to Peak and End Transfers: Evidence From a Conditional Cash Transfer Experiment (November 4, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3278225 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3278225

Sebastian Galiani (Contact Author)

University of Maryland - Department of Economics ( email )

College Park, MD 20742
United States

Nadya Hajj

Wellesley College

106 Central St.
Wellesley, MA 02181
United States

Patrick J. McEwan

Wellesley College, Department of Economics ( email )

106 Central Street
Wellesley, MA 02481
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.patrickmcewan.net

Pablo Ibarraran

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) ( email )

1300 New York Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20577
United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Nandita Krishnaswamy

Columbia University

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

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