Solidarity and Efficiency in Preference Aggregation: A Tale of Two Rules

38 Pages Posted: 26 Nov 2018

See all articles by Stergios Athanasoglou

Stergios Athanasoglou

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS); Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for European Studies (CefES)

Date Written: November 15, 2018

Abstract

This paper is concerned with preference-aggregation rules satisfying desirable efficiency and solidarity requirements. We formulate weaker versions of existing solidarity axioms and show how they imply, in conjunction with strategy-proofness, the existence of reference outcomes holding privileged status. We propose a new class of rules, fixed order status-quo rules, that can be productively contrasted to their closest counterparts in the literature, status-quo rules based on the least upper bound of a lattice. Fixed order status-quo rules satisfy stronger efficiency requirements than lattice status-quo rules but have weaker, though still significant, solidarity properties. A subfamily based on lexicographic orders is analyzed further. Fixed order status-quo rules are characterized by strategy-proofness, strong efficiency, and a third axiom, unanimity-basedness.

Keywords: social choice, preference aggregation, solidarity, efficiency, strategy-proofness, status quo rules

JEL Classification: D71, C70

Suggested Citation

Athanasoglou, Stergios, Solidarity and Efficiency in Preference Aggregation: A Tale of Two Rules (November 15, 2018). University of Milan Bicocca Department of Economics, Management and Statistics Working Paper No. 390, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3285105 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3285105

Stergios Athanasoglou (Contact Author)

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS) ( email )

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Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for European Studies (CefES)

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