Relative Performance Evaluation and Strategic Competition
63 Pages Posted: 26 Nov 2018 Last revised: 8 Nov 2021
Date Written: November 4, 2021
Abstract
We examine how relative performance evaluation (RPE) affects industry competition--a question relevant for corporate boards interested in incentivizing executives. Using U.S. airline data, we estimate a dynamic game of competition with heterogenous firms in an oligopolistic market with RPE contracts. RPE naturally makes CEO compensation less sensitive to market demand. However, because RPE amplifies a firm's cost efficiency relative to its peers, RPE does not always induce aggressive product market competition, often weakening competition from inefficient firms. While RPE induces endogenous selection of efficient firms into large, high entry-cost markets, and vice versa, RPE has little effect in uncompetitive markets.
Keywords: relative performance evaluation, entry and exit, competition
JEL Classification: G32, G34, L41, L10
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