Brief for Amici Curiae John M. Connor, Martin Gaynor, Daniel Mcfadden, Roger Noll, Jeffrey M. Perloff, Joseph A. Stiglitz, Lawrence J. White, and Ralph A. Winter in Support of Petitioners; In the Supreme Court of the United States; States of Ohio, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Rhode Island, Utah, and Vermont, Petitioners v. American Express Company, and American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc., Respondents.

32 Pages Posted: 12 Dec 2018

See all articles by John M. Connor

John M. Connor

American Antitrust Institute (AAI); Purdue University

Martin Gaynor

Carnegie Mellon University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation

Daniel L. McFadden

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Roger G. Noll

Stanford University - Department of Economics

Jeffrey M. Perloff

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics

Joseph E. Stiglitz

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Lawrence J. White

Stern School of Business, New York University; New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics

Ralph A. Winter

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Division of Finance

Date Written: July 6, 2017

Abstract

The court erred by: (1) assuming that that the characterization of the Amex service as a two-sided platform should fundamentally change the antitrust principles that govern the Amex restraints, (2) misunderstanding the nature of competition in two-sided markets, (3) placing the burden on plaintiffs to disprove that the harm from supracompetitive merchant fees are not outweighed by benefits to third parties (cardholders in this case), and most importantly (4) disregarding the critical antitrust issue – the impacts of the Amex merchant anti-steering and pricing restraints on competition among credit card platforms.

Keywords: Antitrust, Competition, Two-sided markets

JEL Classification: L4, L41, L1, L12

Suggested Citation

Connor, John M. and Connor, John M. and Gaynor, Martin and McFadden, Daniel L. and Noll, Roger G. and Perloff, Jeffrey M. and Stiglitz, Joseph E. and White, Lawrence J. and White, Lawrence J. and Winter, Ralph A., Brief for Amici Curiae John M. Connor, Martin Gaynor, Daniel Mcfadden, Roger Noll, Jeffrey M. Perloff, Joseph A. Stiglitz, Lawrence J. White, and Ralph A. Winter in Support of Petitioners; In the Supreme Court of the United States; States of Ohio, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Rhode Island, Utah, and Vermont, Petitioners v. American Express Company, and American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc., Respondents. (July 6, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3287799 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3287799

John M. Connor

Purdue University ( email )

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American Antitrust Institute (AAI) ( email )

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Martin Gaynor (Contact Author)

Carnegie Mellon University ( email )

H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy
and Management
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation

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Daniel L. McFadden

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Roger G. Noll

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Jeffrey M. Perloff

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics ( email )

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Berkeley, CA 94720
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HOME PAGE: http://are.berkeley.edu/~perloff

Joseph E. Stiglitz

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.josephstiglitz.com

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Lawrence J. White

Stern School of Business, New York University ( email )

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New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics ( email )

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Ralph A. Winter

University of British Columbia (UBC) - Division of Finance ( email )

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Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2
Canada
604-822-8339 (Phone)
604-822-8377 (Fax)

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