Contracting for Catastrophe: Legitimizing Emergency Constitutions by Drawing on Social Contract Theory

31 Pages Posted: 13 Dec 2018

See all articles by Stefan Voigt

Stefan Voigt

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: November 21, 2018

Abstract

States of emergency are declared frequently in all parts of the world. Their declaration routinely implies a suspension of basic constitutional rights. In the last half century, it has become the norm for constitutions to contain an explicit “emergency constitution”, i.e., the constitutionally safeguarded rules of operation for a state of emergency. In this paper, I ask whether inclusion of an emergency constitution can be legitimized by drawing on social contract theory. I argue that there are important arguments, both against and in favor of constitutionalized emergency provisions, and that social contract theory - as applied by economists - can be of some help when deciding whether to have, or not to have an emergency constitution.

Keywords: State of Emergency, Martial Law, State of Siege, Emergency Constitution, Constitutional Political Economy, Social Contract Theory

JEL Classification: D71, H11, K00

Suggested Citation

Voigt, Stefan, Contracting for Catastrophe: Legitimizing Emergency Constitutions by Drawing on Social Contract Theory (November 21, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3288664 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3288664

Stefan Voigt (Contact Author)

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics ( email )

Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany
+49-40-428385782 (Phone)
+49-40-428386794 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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