Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion

63 Pages Posted: 17 Dec 2018

See all articles by Giuseppe Attanasi

Giuseppe Attanasi

Université de Nice Sophia Antipolis - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion (GREDEG)

Claire Rimbaud

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE)

Marie Claire Villeval

GATE, CNRS

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Abstract

Psychological game theory can contribute to renew the analysis of unethical behavior by providing insights on the nature of the moral costs of dishonesty. We investigate the moral costs of embezzlement in situations where donors need intermediaries to transfer their donations to recipients and where donations can be embezzled before they reach the recipients. We design a novel three-player Embezzlement Mini-Game to study whether intermediaries in the laboratory suffer from guilt aversion and whether guilt aversion affects the decision to embezzle. We show that the proportion of guilt-averse intermediaries is the same irrespective of the direction of guilt and guilt aversion reduces embezzlement. Structural estimates indicate no difference in the effect of guilt aversion toward the donor and toward the recipient on intermediaries' behavior. This is striking as embezzlement affects the earnings of the recipient but not those of the donor. It shows that guilt aversion matters even when decisions have no direct monetary consequences.

Keywords: embezzlement, dishonesty, guilt aversion, psychological game theory, experiment

JEL Classification: C91

Suggested Citation

Attanasi, Giuseppe and Rimbaud, Claire and Villeval, Marie Claire, Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion. IZA Discussion Paper No. 11956, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3301708 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3301708

Giuseppe Attanasi (Contact Author)

Université de Nice Sophia Antipolis - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion (GREDEG) ( email )

250, rue Albert Einstein
Valbonne, 06560
France

Claire Rimbaud

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE) ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France

Marie Claire Villeval

GATE, CNRS ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France
+33 472 86 60 79 (Phone)
+33 472 86 60 90 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/marie-claire-villeval

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