Credit Risk, Debt Overhang, and the Life Cycle of Callable Bonds

Review of Finance, forthcoming

Swedish House of Finance Research Paper No. 18-16

63 Pages Posted: 17 Dec 2018 Last revised: 19 Jan 2024

See all articles by Bo Becker

Bo Becker

Stockholm School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); ECGI

Murillo Campello

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Viktor Thell

Swedish FSA

Dong Yan

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Rotterdam School of Management (RSM); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: December 20, 2023

Abstract

We show that callable bonds have both higher yields and lower market prices than matched non-callable bonds of the same issuer-time, reflecting the value of call features to issuers and investors. This "value of callability" as well as the inclusion and the exercise of call rights are jointly determined by issuer credit quality. Critically, our agency-based theoretical and empirical analyses show that callability reduces debt overhang in corporate mergers. Our results help explain the value and increasing prevalence of callable bonds in credit markets.

Keywords: Callable bonds, Credit risk, Debt overhang, Investment decisions.

JEL Classification: G32, G33, G21

Suggested Citation

Becker, Bo and Campello, Murillo and Thell, Viktor and Yan, Dong, Credit Risk, Debt Overhang, and the Life Cycle of Callable Bonds (December 20, 2023). Review of Finance, forthcoming, Swedish House of Finance Research Paper No. 18-16, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3302502 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3302502

Bo Becker (Contact Author)

Stockholm School of Economics ( email )

Drottninggatan 98
Dept. of Finance
111 60 Stockholm, 11160
Sweden

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

ECGI ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Murillo Campello

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )

114 East Avenue
369 Sage Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.johnson.cornell.edu/Faculty-And-Research/Profile.aspx?id=mnc35

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138

Viktor Thell

Swedish FSA ( email )

Box 7821
Brunnsgatan 3
Stockholm
Sweden

Dong Yan

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Rotterdam School of Management (RSM) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
Room T08-21
3000 DR Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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