Multimarket Lobbying with Reserves

20 Pages Posted: 28 Jan 2019 Last revised: 14 Oct 2020

See all articles by Oz Shy

Oz Shy

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta

Date Written: October 13, 2020

Abstract

This article presents a model of two firms with fixed budgets that simultaneously hire lobbyists to obtain exclusive contracts in multiple markets. In a pure-strategy equilibrium, neither firm can increase its payoff by using its reserves to hire more lobbyists in any market. Efficiency criterion is defined in order to facilitate the ranking of lobbyist allocations with the same payoffs, where efficiency is improved with the aggregate number of lobbyists that firms keep on reserve. Efficiency comparisons are used to reduced the number of pure-strategy equilibria.

Keywords: Multimarket lobbying , reserves, fixed budget for lobbying, Colonel Blotto games, pure-strategy equilibria.

JEL Classification: D72, C72

Suggested Citation

Shy, Oz, Multimarket Lobbying with Reserves (October 13, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3316483 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3316483

Oz Shy (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ( email )

1000 Peachtree Street N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30309-4470
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.frbatlanta.org/research/economists/shy-oz.aspx?panel=1

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
47
Abstract Views
612
PlumX Metrics