The Long-Term Relationship Between De Jure and De Facto Judicial Independence

12 Pages Posted: 30 Jan 2019 Last revised: 2 Aug 2019

See all articles by Bernd Hayo

Bernd Hayo

University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics

Stefan Voigt

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: 2018 - notable update June, 2019

Abstract

Please note that this is a revised version of the original working paper. In particular, we substantially extended the sample across countries and time. As a result of these changes, our findings changed considerably compared to the first version of the paper.

We study the long-term and dynamic relationship between de jureand de factoj udicial independence using a large panel dataset covering up to 87 countries and as many as 61 years. In line with the prevailing theoretical view in the literature, our analysis shows a positive relationship between these variables. However, the magnitude of the relationship is quite small. The positive relationship between the two variables is primarily driven bynon-OECD countries.

Keywords: judicial independence, de facto, de jure, long-term panel data analysis, cointegration, Granger causality

JEL Classification: D72, D78, K42

Suggested Citation

Hayo, Bernd and Voigt, Stefan, The Long-Term Relationship Between De Jure and De Facto Judicial Independence (2018 - notable update June, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3318549 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3318549

Bernd Hayo (Contact Author)

University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics ( email )

Universitaetsstr. 24
Marburg, D-35032
Germany
++49(0)6421-28-23091 (Phone)
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Stefan Voigt

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics ( email )

Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany
+49-40-428385782 (Phone)
+49-40-428386794 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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