Download This PaperA New Consensus Protocol: Quadratic Voting With Multiple Alternatives
11 Pages Posted: 2 Feb 2019 Last revised: 6 Apr 2019
Date Written: April 4, 2019
Abstract
We study a voting scheme for multiple alternatives. Our scheme generalizes the two-alternative quadratic voting scheme of Lalley and Weyl. We prove that our generalization results in an outcome where the most-valued alternative wins, and that the vote totals order alternatives from most-to-least valued.
Keywords: Quadratic Voting, Voting Paradoxes, Duverger’s Law, Social Choice
JEL Classification: D61, D71
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Eguia, Jon X. and Immorlica, Nicole and Ligett, Katrina and Weyl, Eric Glen and Xefteris, Dimitrios, A New Consensus Protocol: Quadratic Voting With Multiple Alternatives (April 4, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3319508 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3319508
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