Trials of Peace: Post-Conflict Criminal Prosecutions and Conflict Recurrence

Abstract

Particularly in light of the creation of the International Criminal Court, academics and policymakers have debated the relative merits of prosecuting perpetrators of gross human rights violations while simultaneously building peace in societies emerging from conflict. Proponents argue that trials can physically and politically sideline would-be spoilers, while also helping to (re)establish the rule of law. Critics, by contrast, worry that, in the absence of amnesties to assuage potential spoilers’ fears, trials can undermine peace-building efforts by incentivizing violence and generating new injustices. Existing research fails to account for qualitative differences in trial activity, however. Using a global dataset of prosecutions and amnesties, this paper examines whether the timing and type of prosecution influences the probability of conflict recurrence. We present new evidence that amnesties make peace more durable in the short term, but trials of state agents decrease conflict recurrence in the long term.

Keywords: human rights, civil war, prosecution, amnesty