Social Order Through Constitutional Choice: A Contractarian Proposal

Posted: 18 Sep 1996 Last revised: 22 Oct 2009

See all articles by Niclas Berggren

Niclas Berggren

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); University of Economics, Prague - Faculty of Economics and Public Administration

Date Written: 1996

Abstract

The present paper consists of two closely related parts: one which outlines a normative criterion for evaluating the legitimacy of constitutional change and one which specifies a particular proposal of a constitution. The criterion used stems directly from the "pragmatic" brand of contractarianism developed by Buchanan, where an approximate rule of unanimity is utilized. The proposal aims at the highest possible freedom of choice for individuals when it comes to defining the political system of their liking: a core (dealing with public goods and rights) is common for all, but everything else can vary between different sub-constitutions between which individuals choose.

JEL Classification: D63, D70, H11, H70

Suggested Citation

Berggren, Niclas, Social Order Through Constitutional Choice: A Contractarian Proposal (1996). Public Choice, Vol. 89, No. 3-4, 1996, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3330

Niclas Berggren (Contact Author)

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://www.ifn.se/nb

University of Economics, Prague - Faculty of Economics and Public Administration ( email )

nám. W. Churchilla 4
Praha, 130 67
Czech Republic

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