Comfort and Conformity: A Culture-Based Theory of Migration

23 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2019

See all articles by Ruxanda Berlinschi

Ruxanda Berlinschi

KU Leuven Campus Brussels

Jan Fidrmuc

Brunel University - Department of Economics and Finance; L.E.M., Université de Lille; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Global Labor Organization (GLO); Institute for Strategy and Analysis, Government Office of the Slovak Republic

Date Written: 2018

Abstract

This paper proposes a theory of migration decisions in which cultural traits play a role. Individuals are assumed to value comfort (high wages) and conformity (interactions with individuals who share similar world views). Regions are assumed to differ economically (average wages) and culturally (average world views and their diversity). The model shows that self-selection of inter-regional migrants on world views is non-monotonic if one region is more diverse than the other, and it weakens with economic gaps between regions. This non-monotonicity can lead to a dichotomy of outcomes: culturally diverse regions become even more diverse because of migration, while culturally homogeneous regions become even more homogeneous. Consequently, Tieboutian sorting (people moving to the region in which world views are closer to theirs) only holds when regions have similar wages and diversity of world views.

Keywords: migration, self-selection, culture, diversity, Tiebout model

JEL Classification: A130;, F220;, J610;, Z100

Suggested Citation

Berlinschi, Ruxanda and Fidrmuc, Jan and Fidrmuc, Jan, Comfort and Conformity: A Culture-Based Theory of Migration (2018). CESifo Working Paper No. 7294, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3338620 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3338620

Ruxanda Berlinschi (Contact Author)

KU Leuven Campus Brussels ( email )

Warmoesberg 26
Brussel, 1000
Belgium

Jan Fidrmuc

Brunel University - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Uxbridge UB8 3PH
United Kingdom
+44 1895 266 528 (Phone)
+44 1895 269 770 (Fax)

L.E.M., Université de Lille ( email )

France

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Global Labor Organization (GLO) ( email )

Collogne
Germany

Institute for Strategy and Analysis, Government Office of the Slovak Republic ( email )

Bratislava
Slovakia

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