Social Norms and Legal Design

CRREP Working Paper Series 2019-02

50 Pages Posted: 27 Mar 2019

See all articles by Bruno Deffains

Bruno Deffains

Université Paris II - Panthéon-Assas; Institut Universitaire de France

Claude Fluet

Université Laval

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 1, 2019

Abstract

We consider legal obligations against a background of social norms, e.g., societal norms, professional codes of conduct or business standards. Violations of the law trigger reputational sanctions insofar as they signal non-adherence to underlying norms, raising the issue of the design of offences. When society is only concerned with the trade-off between deterrence and enforcement costs, legal standards defining offences should align on underlying norms so long as the latter are not too deficient. When providing productive information to third parties is also a concern, legal standards should either align on underlying norms with fines that trade off deterrence against the provision of information; or legal standards should be more demanding and enforced with purely symbolic sanctions, e.g., public reprimands. Our analysis has implications for general law enforcement and regulatory policies.

Keywords: stigmatization, reputational sanctions, social norms, law enforcement, legal standard, com-pliance, deterrence

JEL Classification: D8, K4, Z13

Suggested Citation

Deffains, Bruno and Fluet, Claude-Denys, Social Norms and Legal Design (February 1, 2019). CRREP Working Paper Series 2019-02, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3345622 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3345622

Bruno Deffains (Contact Author)

Université Paris II - Panthéon-Assas ( email )

12 place du Pantheon
Paris cedex 05, 75005
France

Institut Universitaire de France ( email )

103, bld Saint-Michel
75005 Paris
France

Claude-Denys Fluet

Université Laval ( email )

2214 Pavillon J-A. DeSeve
Quebec, Quebec G1K 7P4
Canada
1-418-656-2131, ext 3290 (Phone)

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