A Prospect-Theory Model of Voter Turnout

27 Pages Posted: 18 Mar 2019

See all articles by Oliver Herrmann

Oliver Herrmann

University of Groningen

Richard Jong-A-Pin

University of Groningen - Department of Economics (Economie)

Lambert Schoonbeek

University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Economics

Date Written: 2019

Abstract

We incorporate prospect-theory preferences in a game-theoretic model to study voter turnout. We show that voter turnout is heavily affected by agents having subjective reference points with respect to the vote or abstain decision and their subjective probability weighting in the decision-making process. Using empirically based parameter values, we show that our model has lower prediction error than other game-theoretic models with standard expected-utility preferences. We also find that our model maintains desirable comparative statics effects and leads to higher turnout predictions in larger electorates.

Keywords: voting behavior, Downsian paradox, prospect-theory preferences

JEL Classification: D720

Suggested Citation

Herrmann, Oliver and Jong-A-Pin, Richard and Schoonbeek, Lambert, A Prospect-Theory Model of Voter Turnout (2019). CESifo Working Paper No. 7541, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3352905 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3352905

Oliver Herrmann (Contact Author)

University of Groningen ( email )

P.O. Box 800
9700 AH Groningen, Groningen 9700 AV
Netherlands

Richard Jong-A-Pin

University of Groningen - Department of Economics (Economie) ( email )

P.O. Box 800
9700 AV Groningen
Netherlands

Lambert Schoonbeek

University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 800
9700 AV Groningen
Netherlands

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