A Note on Productive and Dynamic Inefficiencies of Intermediate Regulatory Sanctions
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 19-07
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2020
9 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2019 Last revised: 6 Feb 2020
Date Written: March 18, 2019
Abstract
This article shows that moderate regulatory sanctions can generate subtle problems not apparent in simple enforcement models. Assuming that firms may ultimately face different noncompliance detection probabilities, we highlight that moderate sanctions may conflict with aspects of both static and dynamic efficiency.
Keywords: Regulation, Sanctions, Compliance, Technology
JEL Classification: K42, L51
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Friehe, Tim and Mungan, Murat C., A Note on Productive and Dynamic Inefficiencies of Intermediate Regulatory Sanctions (March 18, 2019). George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 19-07, The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3354938 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3354938
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