Privatization Revisited: The Effects of Foreign and Domestic Owners on Corporate Performance

CERGE-EI Discussion Paper 89

Posted: 10 Oct 2002

See all articles by Lubomir Lizal

Lubomir Lizal

Czech Technical University - Faculty of Electrical Engineering; Anglo-American University; Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI, a joint workplace of Charles University and the Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences

Jan Svejnar

School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, NY, USA; CEPR; IZA; CERGE-EI; University of Ljubljana

Abstract

Privatization is often viewed as a necessary condition for improved corporate performance. We use a 1992-98 panel of the population of Czech industrial firms to assess the effect of mass privatization on corporate performance. Using numerous performance indicators, we find that foreign owners unambiguously improve long-term performance of the former state-owned enterprises. The results with respect to privatization to domestic owners are much less impressive. Our study provides strong support for the hypothesis that foreign investment improves corporate performance, but it provides very sobering evidence with respect to the hypothesis that privatization to domestic owners improves performance.

Keywords: corporate performance, Czech Republic, ownership, privatization, restructuring and transition

JEL Classification: D20, G30, P21, P31, P34

Suggested Citation

Lizal, Lubomir and Svejnar, Jan, Privatization Revisited: The Effects of Foreign and Domestic Owners on Corporate Performance. CERGE-EI Discussion Paper 89, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=336222

Lubomir Lizal (Contact Author)

Czech Technical University - Faculty of Electrical Engineering ( email )

Technicka 2
Jug. Partyzanu 3
Prague 6, 166 27
Czech Republic

Anglo-American University ( email )

Lazenska 4
11800 Praha 1
Prague 1, 11800
Czech Republic

Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI, a joint workplace of Charles University and the Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences ( email )

Politickych veznu 7
Prague, 111 21
Czech Republic
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+420 2 2422 7143 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cerge-ei.cz

Jan Svejnar

School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, NY, USA ( email )

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New York, NY 10027
United States

CEPR

London
United Kingdom

IZA

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Germany

CERGE-EI

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University of Ljubljana ( email )

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Ljubljana, 1000
Slovenia

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