Of Governance and Revenue: Participatory Institutions and Tax Compliance in Brazil

37 Pages Posted: 31 Mar 2019

Date Written: March 28, 2019

Abstract

Traditionally, governments seek to mobilize tax revenues by expanding their enforcement of existing tax regimes and facilitating tax payments. However, enforcement and facilitation can be costly and produce diminishing marginal returns if citizens are unwilling to pay their taxes. This paper addresses gaps in knowledge about tax compliance, by asking a basic question: what explains why citizens and businesses comply with tax rules? To answer this question, the paper shows how the voluntary adoption of two different types of participatory governance institutions influences municipal tax collection in Brazil. Municipalities that voluntarily adopt participatory institutions collect significantly higher levels of taxes than similar municipalities without these institutions. The paper provides evidence that moves scholarship on tax compliance beyond enforcement and facilitation paradigms, while offering a better assessment of the role of local democratic institutions for government performance and tax compliance.

Keywords: Tax Law, Tax Administration, Health Care Services Industry, Public Financial Management, Public Sector Economics, Public Finance Decentralization and Poverty Reduction, Economic Adjustment and Lending, Taxation & Subsidies, Macro-Fiscal Policy, Educational Sciences

Suggested Citation

Touchton, Michael Ryan and Wampler, Brian and Peixoto, Tiago Carneiro, Of Governance and Revenue: Participatory Institutions and Tax Compliance in Brazil (March 28, 2019). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 8797, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3362641

Michael Ryan Touchton (Contact Author)

University of Miami ( email )

Coral Gables, FL 33124
United States

Brian Wampler

Boise State University ( email )

Boise, ID
United States

Tiago Carneiro Peixoto

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
273
Abstract Views
824
Rank
206,298
PlumX Metrics