Corporate Governance and CEO Compensation in China

37 Pages Posted: 29 Jan 2003

See all articles by Oliver M. Rui

Oliver M. Rui

China Europe International Business School (CEIBS); affiliation not provided to SSRN

Michael Firth

Lingnan University - Department of Finance and Insurance

Peter M.Y. Fung

Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Date Written: September 2002

Abstract

This paper contributes to the international corporate governance literature by examining factors that affect CEO compensation in China. In particular, we develop models of CEO pay based on an understanding of the unique economic and structural reforms undertaken by the partially privatized state owned Enterprises (SOEs). We find that corporate governance factors have a significant impact on CEO compensation but they do so in ways that differ from those in other countries. Our conclusions are robust across different formulations of the basic model and they have public policy implications for China and other transitional economies that are moving away from state ownership of business enterprises.

Keywords: Compensation, SOEs

JEL Classification: G3, P2

Suggested Citation

Rui, Oliver M. and Rui, Oliver M. and Firth, Michael and Fung, Peter M.Y., Corporate Governance and CEO Compensation in China (September 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=337841 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.337841

Oliver M. Rui (Contact Author)

China Europe International Business School (CEIBS) ( email )

699 Hong Feng Road
Pudong
Shanghai 201206
China
86-21-28905618 (Phone)
86-21-28905620 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.ceibs.edu/rui-oliver

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Michael Firth

Lingnan University - Department of Finance and Insurance ( email )

Castle Peak Road
Tuen Mun, New Territories
Hong Kong
China
+852 2616 8160 (Phone)
+852 2466 4751 (Fax)

Peter M.Y. Fung

Hong Kong Polytechnic University ( email )

Hung Hom, Kowloon
Hong Kong

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