A Bargaining Theory of Political Bias and War: Case Study of the BJP

Abstract

Economic theorizations of political bias and war as laid out in Bargaining Theory (Jackson and Morelli 2007; Anderton and Carter 2009) have demonstrated that a political leadership’s penchant for war may be much higher than that of the people they represent, and the calculus of war for internal political gains can spur them on to inter-state violence. To put this assertion to the test, this working paper examines the BJP under Narendra Modi as instigator of the Pulwama War and the India-Pakistan standoff of 2019. The findings of the working paper indicate that the BJP government’s expediency of war conforms to, and resonates with, the bargaining theory of political bias and war, as theorized in the game-theoretic economic literature.

Keywords: bargaining theory, india, pakistan, game theory, politics, war, pulwama