The Effect of the Union Wage Differential on Management Opposition and Union Organizing Success
14 Pages Posted: 7 Jul 2004 Last revised: 13 Oct 2022
Date Written: October 1985
Abstract
This paper argues that under current U.S. institutional arrangements, in which managements opposition to unions is as important as workers and unions,the magnitude of the union wage premium actually reduces organization rather than increasing it. It reduces organizing success by lowering profits, thus giving management a greater incentive to oppose unions. It shows that in the traditional monopoly model, any given premium can cause management to donate more resources to opposing a union than workers will donate to organizing. Empirical evidence from NLRB elections supports the model in which larger premiums induce greater opposition and thus reduce union organizing success.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
Determinants of Trade Union Membership in Western Germany: Evidence from Micro Data, 1980-2000
By Claus Schnabel and Joachim Wagner
-
Trade Union Membership in Eastern and Western Germany: Convergence or Divergence?
By Claus Schnabel and Joachim Wagner
-
Determinants of Union Membership in 18 EU Countries: Evidence from Micro Data, 2002/03
By Claus Schnabel and Joachim Wagner