The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement: Settlement of Disputes

Mexico Center, Rice University's Baker Institute for Public Policy (May 2, 2019)

Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 19-08

13 Pages Posted: 17 May 2019

See all articles by David A. Gantz

David A. Gantz

Univ. Of Arizona College of Law; Mexico Center, Baker Institute

Date Written: May 2, 2019

Abstract

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) incorporated three distinct dispute settlement mechanisms. These address:

1) investor-state disputes (ISDS) between foreign investors and host states;

2) binational panel review of national administrative agency rulings under domestic anti-dumping (AD) and subsidy/countervailing duty (CVD) laws; and

3) state-to-state disputes challenging another party’s application or interpretation of the agreement.

The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) incorporates the same three mechanisms, only one of which, ISDS, is extensively modified. This article addresses the individual mechanisms and the context under which the negotiations took place, emphasizing the elimination of ISDS coverage for U.S.-Canada disputes and the limitations placed on such disputes between the United States and Mexico. The lack of improvements to NAFTA's deeply flawed state to state dispute resolution system is also discussed.

Keywords: Mexico, NAFTA, USMCA, dispute settlement

Suggested Citation

Gantz, David A., The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement: Settlement of Disputes (May 2, 2019). Mexico Center, Rice University's Baker Institute for Public Policy (May 2, 2019), Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 19-08, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3389420

David A. Gantz (Contact Author)

Univ. Of Arizona College of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 210176
Rogers College of Law
Tucson, AZ 85721-0176
United States
520-490-3004 (Phone)

Mexico Center, Baker Institute ( email )

6100 Main Street, MS-40
Houston, TX 77005
United States
520-490-3004 (Phone)

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