Download This PaperContest Architecture with Public Disclosures
22 Pages Posted: 12 Jun 2019
Date Written: May 28, 2019
Abstract
I study optimal disclosure policies in sequential contests. A contest designer chooses at which periods to publicly disclose the efforts of previous contestants. I provide results for a wide range of possible objectives for the contest designer. While different objectives involve different trade-offs, I show that under many circumstances the optimal contest is one of the three basic contest structures widely studied in the literature: simultaneous, first-mover, or sequential contest.
Keywords: contests, sequential games, contest design, rent-seeking, R&D, advertising
JEL Classification: C72, C73, D72, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Hinnosaar, Toomas, Contest Architecture with Public Disclosures (May 28, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3394708 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3394708
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