Conflict Termination, Signals of State Weakness and Violent Urban Social Disorder in the Developing World

Abstract

Warfare often spills over into contentious mobilization in cities. However, violent urban social disorder is not simply a reflection of broader conflict dynamics. In this article, I argue that armed conflict creates openings for contention in cities when it gives a signal of state weakness. Regime opponents will utilize the favorable political opportunity structure created by the state’s defeat in war to make demands through collective mobilization and violence. In this case, capital cities and major urban areas witness more violent social disorder events such as riots and armed attacks as broader conflicts cease. I test this argument using monthly event data on urban social disorder in 98 cities in the developing world from 1960-2012. I find that conflict termination is associated with more frequent lethal urban disorder events, but only when it results in defeat for the incumbent government. Other types of conflict outcome are not significantly correlated with violent urban disorder. These findings suggest that contention in cities follows a different logic from that of warfare, in some cases increasing as broader armed conflicts subside.

Keywords: conflict, mobilization, revolution, conflict termination, urban violence

JEL Classification: D74