Relative Performance Feedback in Education: Evidence From a Randomized Controlled Trial

64 Pages Posted: 25 Jun 2019 Last revised: 17 Apr 2021

See all articles by Loretti Dobrescu

Loretti Dobrescu

UNSW Australia Business School, School of Economics

Marco Faravelli

The University of Queensland

Rigissa Megalokonomou

University of Queensland - School of Economics

Alberto Motta

UNSW Australia Business School, School of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 19, 2019

Abstract

In a 1-year randomized controlled trial involving thousands of university students, we provide real-time private feedback on relative performance in a semester-long online assignment. Within this setup, our experimental design cleanly identifies the behavioral response to rank incentives (i.e., the incentives stemming from an inherent preference for high rank). We find that rank incentives not only boost performance in the related course assignment, but also increase the average grade across all exams taken in the (intervention) course by 0.21 standard deviations. These beneficial effects remain sizeable across all quantiles and extend beyond the time of the intervention. Furthermore, relative performance feedback seems to stimulate social learning, i.e., rank incentives make students engage more in peer interactions. Finally, we explore the virtues of real-time feedback by analyzing a number of alternative variations in the way it is provided.

Keywords: relative performance feedback, rank incentives, social learning, academic performance, randomized controlled trial

JEL Classification: J24, J18

Suggested Citation

Dobrescu, Loretti Isabella and Faravelli, Marco and Megalokonomou, Rigissa and Motta, Alberto, Relative Performance Feedback in Education: Evidence From a Randomized Controlled Trial (June 19, 2019). UNSW Business School Research Paper Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3406696 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3406696

Loretti Isabella Dobrescu (Contact Author)

UNSW Australia Business School, School of Economics ( email )

High Street
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia

Marco Faravelli

The University of Queensland ( email )

Australia

Rigissa Megalokonomou

University of Queensland - School of Economics ( email )

Brisbane, QLD 4072
Australia

Alberto Motta

UNSW Australia Business School, School of Economics ( email )

High Street
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/albertomottaeconomics/

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
230
Abstract Views
1,499
Rank
182,864
PlumX Metrics