Integrity in Law’s Empire

Abstract

In this paper I focus on Dworkin's arguments for the distinctive political virtue of integrity, arguing that we have serious reasons to doubt that the case for integrity has been made. I approach Dworkin’s complex argument in two main steps, following his two main arguments for the distinct value of integrity. The first, and more direct argument, is based on what Dworkin takes to be the grounds for rejecting “checkerboard laws”. The second argument is the one that ties the value of integrity to political legitimacy by way of articulating the value of integrity in light of its affinity with Fraternity, the idea of a “true community”, and the associative obligations such communities engender. I try to show in this paper that both of these lines of argument are not convincing.

Keywords: Dworkin, integrity, checkerboard laws, associative obligations, political obligations, political legitimacy, value pluralism, moral coherence