Competition and the Role of Group Identity

35 Pages Posted: 23 Jul 2019

See all articles by Francesca Cornaglia

Francesca Cornaglia

Queen Mary University of London; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE), CEP; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Michalis Drouvelis

University of Birmingham - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute

Paolo Masella

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Date Written: 2019

Abstract

The emergence of competition is a defining aspect of human nature and characterizes many important social environments. However, its relationship with how social groups are formed has received little attention. We design an experiment to analyze how individuals' willingness to compete is affected by group identity. We find that individuals display substantially stronger competitiveness in within group (ingroup) matchings than in between group (outgroup) matchings or in a control setting where no group identity is induced. We also find that the effect of group identity is stronger for subjects who participated more actively in the team-building task.

Keywords: competition, social distance, group identity, laboratory experiment

JEL Classification: C920, D030

Suggested Citation

Cornaglia, Francesca and Drouvelis, Michalis and Masella, Paolo, Competition and the Role of Group Identity (2019). CESifo Working Paper No. 7643, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3422224 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3422224

Francesca Cornaglia (Contact Author)

Queen Mary University of London ( email )

Mile End Road
London, E14NS
United Kingdom

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE), CEP ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Michalis Drouvelis

University of Birmingham - Department of Economics ( email )

Economics Department
Birmingham, B15 2TT
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/michalisdrouvelis/

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 01069
Germany

Paolo Masella

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Bologna
Italy

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