Intertemporal Evidence on the Strategy of Populism

46 Pages Posted: 29 Jul 2019

See all articles by Gloria Gennaro

Gloria Gennaro

Bocconi University - Baffi Carefin Centre

Giampaolo Lecce

University of Groningen - Faculty of Economics and Business

Massimo Morelli

Bocconi University

Date Written: June 2019

Abstract

Do candidates use populism to maximize the impact of political campaigns? Is the supply of populism strategic? We apply automated text analysis to all available 2016 US Presidential campaign speeches and 2018 midterm campaign programs using a continuous index of populism. This novel dataset shows that the use of populist rhetoric is responsive to the level of expected demand for populism in the local audience. In particular, we provide evidence that current U.S. President Donald Trump uses more populist rhetoric in swing states and in locations where economic insecurity is prevalent. These findings were confirmed when the analysis was extended to recent legislative campaigns wherein candidates tended towards populism when campaigning in stiffly competitive districts where constituents are experiencing high levels of economic insecurity. We also show that pandering is more common for candidates who can credibly sustain anti-elite positions, such as those with shorter political careers. Finally, our results suggest that a populist strategy is rewarded by voters since higher levels of populism are associated with higher shares of the vote, precisely in competitive districts where voters are experiencing economic insecurity.

Keywords: American Politics, Electoral Campaign, populism, Text Analysis

JEL Classification: D7

Suggested Citation

Gennaro, Gloria and Lecce, Giampaolo and Morelli, Massimo, Intertemporal Evidence on the Strategy of Populism (June 2019). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13804, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3428324

Gloria Gennaro (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Baffi Carefin Centre ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan
Italy

Giampaolo Lecce

University of Groningen - Faculty of Economics and Business ( email )

Postbus 72
9700 AB Groningen
Netherlands

Massimo Morelli

Bocconi University ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

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