Rethinking the Global Anti-money Laundering Regulations to Deter Corruption

Submitted Manuscript Under Review(SMUR) version, 67(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 695 (Cambridge University Press, 2018)

38 Pages Posted: 5 Aug 2019 Last revised: 9 Mar 2021

See all articles by Sungyong Kang

Sungyong Kang

INTERPOL Financial Crime and Anti-Corruption Center

Date Written: March 30, 2018

Abstract

While ‘global anti-money laundering (AML)’ regulations aim to detect and deter corrupt ‘politically exposed persons (PEPs)’, they have caused tremendous collateral damage to many innocent PEPs, particularly foreign PEPs. Due to the significant compliance costs of identifying and managing accounts of foreign PEPs coupled with an increased risk of serious fines against compliance failures, financial institutions have voluntarily terminated the accounts of foreign PEPs.

Global AML regulations could avoid the collateral damage while maximising the deterrence of corruption if high degrees of coordination along two dimensions are satisfied, namely, transborder coordination and coordination between public enforcement entities and private actors. This study illustrates a cornerstone change made in 2012 to fulfil the first dimension and offers policy recommendations to build on this cornerstone by pursuing coordination along the second dimension.

Keywords: accountability, corruption, global anti-money laundering regulations, politically exposed persons, protection of privacy of PEPs, public–private cooperation

Suggested Citation

Kang, Sungyong, Rethinking the Global Anti-money Laundering Regulations to Deter Corruption (March 30, 2018). Submitted Manuscript Under Review(SMUR) version, 67(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 695 (Cambridge University Press, 2018), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3430159

Sungyong Kang (Contact Author)

INTERPOL Financial Crime and Anti-Corruption Center ( email )

Singapore

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