Commitment Requests Do Not Affect Truth-Telling in Laboratory and Online Experiments

27 Pages Posted: 8 Aug 2019 Last revised: 19 Jun 2023

See all articles by Tobias Cagala

Tobias Cagala

Deutsche Bundesbank

Ulrich Glogowsky

Johannes Kepler University Linz

Johannes Rincke

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg-Friedrich Alexander Universität Erlangen Nürnberg

Simeon Schudy

University of Munich (LMU)

Date Written: August 5, 2019

Abstract

Using a standard cheating game, we investigate whether the request to sign a no-cheating declaration affects truth-telling. Our design varies the content of a no-cheating declaration (reference to ethical behavior vs. reference to possible sanctions) and the type of experiment (online vs. offline). Irrespective of the declaration’s content, commitment requests do not affect truth-telling, neither in the laboratory nor online. The inefficacy of commitment requests appears robust across different samples and does not depend on psychological measures of reactance.

Keywords: cheating; lying; truth-telling; compliance; commitment; no-cheating rule; no-cheating declaration

JEL Classification: D03, D81

Suggested Citation

Cagala, Tobias and Glogowsky, Ulrich and Rincke, Johannes and Schudy, Simeon, Commitment Requests Do Not Affect Truth-Telling in Laboratory and Online Experiments (August 5, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3432445 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3432445

Tobias Cagala (Contact Author)

Deutsche Bundesbank ( email )

Wilhelm-Epstein-Str. 14
Frankfurt/Main, 60431
Germany

Ulrich Glogowsky

Johannes Kepler University Linz ( email )

Linz
Austria

Johannes Rincke

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg-Friedrich Alexander Universität Erlangen Nürnberg ( email )

Schloßplatz 4
Erlangen, DE Bavaria 91054
Germany

Simeon Schudy

University of Munich (LMU) ( email )

Ludwigstrasse 28
Munich, D-80539
Germany
+49 89 2180 9786 (Phone)

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