The Political and Professional Economies of U.S. Global Corporate Criminal Enforcement

The Oxford Handbook of Institutions of International Economic Governance and Market Regulation (E. Brousseau, J-M Glachant & Jérôme Sgard eds. forthcoming 2019)

33 Pages Posted: 17 Aug 2019 Last revised: 29 Aug 2019

Date Written: August 13, 2019

Abstract

This handbook chapter seeks to explain to a mostly international and non-legal audience what drives and shapes the practices of prosecutors in their enforcement of US criminal law against corporations and their agents for conduct outside the United States. This explanation must begin with US law, which has jurisdictional and other features that afford American prosecutors unparalleled leeway and reach. Much more of the explanation for enforcement behaviors, however, lies in the political and professional economies that determine the incentives and choices of the US Department of Justice and its individual prosecutors. This explanation requires an understanding of the domestic political economy of criminal enforcement within the United States and the distinctive structure and culture of the American bar. Beyond this descriptive work, the chapter considers what might lie ahead as present US prosecutorial practices, which have been driven mostly by domestic influences, increasingly run into, or are pursued by, the prosecutorial practices of other nations, as well as attitudes toward prosecution in those nations.

Suggested Citation

Buell, Samuel W., The Political and Professional Economies of U.S. Global Corporate Criminal Enforcement (August 13, 2019). The Oxford Handbook of Institutions of International Economic Governance and Market Regulation (E. Brousseau, J-M Glachant & Jérôme Sgard eds. forthcoming 2019), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3436896

Samuel W. Buell (Contact Author)

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States
919-613-7193 (Phone)

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
25
Abstract Views
153
PlumX Metrics