Enforcing Compliance: The Case of Automatic License Suspensions

62 Pages Posted: 24 Sep 2019 Last revised: 25 Feb 2020

See all articles by Sam Krumholz

Sam Krumholz

U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division

Date Written: September 16, 2019

Abstract

Non-incarcerative punishments such as fines are widely used, but the deterrence and distributional effects of this class of punishments depend crucially on the consequences for punishment noncompliance. I provide new evidence on the importance of these noncompliance costs using a unique natural experiment in Washington that first eliminated and then reinstated automatic driver's license suspensions as a penalty for noncompliance with traffic offenses. The shift in noncompliance costs created by automatic license suspensions lead to large increases in compliance, fine-repayment and total punishment with a stronger effect in low-income zip-codes, but also suggestive declines in traffic accidents among low-income drivers.

Keywords: crime, traffic accidents, fines, license suspension, deterrence, compliance

JEL Classification: K00, K14, H20

Suggested Citation

Krumholz, Sam, Enforcing Compliance: The Case of Automatic License Suspensions (September 16, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3454289 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3454289

Sam Krumholz (Contact Author)

U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division ( email )

DC
United States

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