Lost in Transition? The Persistence of Dictatorship Mayors

63 Pages Posted: 1 Oct 2019 Last revised: 27 Jan 2021

See all articles by Felipe González

Felipe González

Queen Mary University of London

Pablo Munoz

Universidad de Chile

Mounu Prem

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)

Date Written: January 26, 2021

Abstract

We look at Chile’s transition to democracy in 1990 to study the persistence of authoritarian politics at the local level. Using new data on the universe of mayors appointed by the Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1990), and leveraging on the arbitrary election rules that characterized the first local election in 1992, we present two main findings. First, dictatorship mayors obtained a vote premium that is larger among the last wave of incumbents and appears partially explained by an increase in local spending. Second, dictatorship mayors who were democratically elected in 1992 brought votes for the parties that collaborated with the dictatorship in subsequent elections held in democracy. These results show that the body of politicians appointed by a dictatorship can contribute to the persistence of elites and institutions.

Keywords: politicians, dictatorship, democratic transition

JEL Classification: D2, G2, G3, M2

Suggested Citation

González, Felipe and Munoz, Pablo and Prem, Mounu, Lost in Transition? The Persistence of Dictatorship Mayors (January 26, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3456949 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3456949

Felipe González

Queen Mary University of London ( email )

Mile End Road
London, London E1 4NS
United Kingdom

Pablo Munoz

Universidad de Chile ( email )

Beauchef 851, Santiago
Santiago, R. Metropolitana 7520421
Chile

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/pablomh

Mounu Prem (Contact Author)

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

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