Global Manipulation by Local Obfuscation

52 Pages Posted: 27 Oct 2019 Last revised: 19 Apr 2022

See all articles by Fei Li

Fei Li

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill

Yangbo Song

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK)

Mofei Zhao

School of Economics and Management, Beihang University

Date Written: October 17, 2019

Abstract

We study information design in a regime change context. A continuum of agents choose independently whether to attack the current regime and will succeed if and only if the mass of attackers outweighs the regime's strength. The strength is uncertain, and the information designer chooses a strength-dependent experiment to maintain the status quo. The optimal information structure randomizes between partial truth-telling and local exaggeration across agents: some agents receive a signal matching the true strength of the status quo, and others receive an elevated signal professing slightly higher strength. Optimal local obfuscation strictly dominates public signals, and in certain cases where public signals become futile, local obfuscation still guarantees the status quo's survival.

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion, coordination, information design, obfuscation, regime change

JEL Classification: C7, D7, D8

Suggested Citation

Li, Fei and Song, Yangbo and Zhao, Mofei, Global Manipulation by Local Obfuscation (October 17, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3471491 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3471491

Fei Li (Contact Author)

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill ( email )

102 Ridge Road
Chapel Hill, NC NC 27514
United States

Yangbo Song

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) ( email )

Mofei Zhao

School of Economics and Management, Beihang University ( email )

Beijing, 100084
China

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