Bargaining at Retail Stores: Evidence from Vienna

22 Pages Posted: 6 Nov 2019 Last revised: 2 Nov 2020

See all articles by Sandro Shelegia

Sandro Shelegia

Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business, Students; Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Joshua Sherman

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Date Written: October 2019

Abstract

In the West, where posted prices are the norm, it is uncommon to observe consumers receive discounts below the posted price. Nevertheless, we find that when stores are asked, a discount is granted approximately 40% of the time, with a median discount percentage of 10%. Discounts are more likely to be offered by small-scale firms, for higher-priced products, and for non-sale items. More generally, differences in price delegation behavior across firm types serve as an indicator that monitoring costs and employee skills are important drivers of bargaining behavior.

Keywords: Audit Study, Bargaining, posted price, Trading Mechanism

JEL Classification: C78, C93, D12, L81

Suggested Citation

Shelegia, Sandro and Sherman, Joshua, Bargaining at Retail Stores: Evidence from Vienna (October 2019). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14078, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3478774

Sandro Shelegia (Contact Author)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business, Students ( email )

Barcelona
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://www.sandroshelegia.com

Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Joshua Sherman

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

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